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Professional soldiers through the past century and more have 
seldom thought well of the journalists who have accompanied them to 
war. William Howard Russell of The Times, who is generally recognised 
as the father of modern war corresponding for his dispatches from the 
Crimea, was sometimes feared by the generals, but never admired by 
them. In the early days of the American Civil War, an idealistic Union 
general named Irvin McDowell said that he had arranged for cor-
respondents to take the field with the army, "and I have suggested to 
them that they should wear a white uniform to indicate their purity of 
their character." It was not long before any delusions of that sort were 
shattered. By 1898, when General Kitchener led his expeditionary force 
up the Nile to defeat the Mahdi, he was best remembered among the ac-
companying journalists for his answer when they besieged his tent one 
morning in search of news: "Out of my way, you drunken swabs!" 
In the nineteenth century, an image was forged among professional 
soldiers and many civilians of the behaviour of journalists reporting war 
which has persisted in some measure to this day: of a band of anarchistic, 
untrustworthy, ill-conducted men, owing loyalty to nothing save their 
own careers. On the walls of my apartment in London, I have drawings 
from The Graphic and the Illustrated London News from colonial wars 
of the 1880s and 1890s, depicting correspondents advancing to war arm-
ed with cases of whisky, riding while better men walked, looting while 
better men fought. 
The relationship between this image and the reality in the nineteenth 
century was very much the same as it is today. Soldiers fight wars 
because it is their duty to do so. Although they are too gentlemanly to say 
so too loudly or too often, most hunger for the opportunity to 
distinguish themselves in action, because war for the professional soldier 
offers the same career opportunities as a major sales campaign to the 
corporate executive. Civilians, in modern times, take pains to avoid the 
battlefield whenever they can. The old voyeuristic instincts that brought 
ladies and gentlemen in their carriages to the field of Waterloo, and to 
the great battlefields of the American Civil War, have gone. Modern 
weapons make the scenes of conflict between armies too uncertain and 
too dangerous to encourage casual bystanders. 
But most men, most civilians, harbour somewhere in their bosoms a 
curiosity to discover what war is like, and how they themselves would res-
pond to the experience of it. It has been accepted by western societies since 
the nineteenth century—however reluctantly—that journalists must be 
allowed to tell their peoples something of what is being done by the armies 
in their name when they go to war. Therefore, in almost every modern 
war, anything between a handful and some thousands of media cor-
respondents have been authorized to attend the battlefield as privileged 
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spectators. Some—like Russell and G.W. Steevens in the first genera-
tion—have been men of high intelligence and literary gifts, who treated 
their responsibilities very seriously, and filed dispatches that are still read 
and admired today as models of informative reporting. Russell, after all, 
was hounded out of the United States for telling the world after Bull Run 
that the Union forces had broken in rout, when the Washington ad-
ministration and the Union command recoiled from admitting the truth. 
Yet in addition to the serious, objective and dedicated reporters, 
from the beginning there have also been the voyeurs, the sensation 
seekers, the political propagandists, the drunkards, the louts, the 
cowards. And yes, on the whole throughout the history of war cor-
responding, these men have outnumbered the serious reporters: perhaps 
not in their influence upon the public, but in the perception of the profes-
sional soldiers on the spot, and in later legend. Vietnam, more than any 
war, attracted a host of cheap thrill seekers, war lovers, women war 
"groupies," reporters who never left the bars of Saigon. 
That great military analyst S.L.A. Marshall wrote bitterly of the 
lack of national loyalty among the new breed of reporters in Vietnam: 
"In the days of yore the American correspondent . . . was an American 
first, a correspondent second. This old-fashioned standard seems to have 
been forgotten in south-east Asia. Some old-timers still play the game ac-
cording to the rules. There is a new breed that acts as if it believes a press 
ticket is a licence to run the world." I shall say a little more later about 
the danger to the profession of journalism, never mind to a nation in 
arms, that is posed by the hubris of not a few modern war cor-
respondents. 
Yet I do not believe that we should any more allow the undoubted 
existence of some reporters of the most indifferent qualities in modern 
military theatres to define our entire picture of the media at war than we 
should let the knowledge that armies possess rather more stupid and in-
different officers than distinguished ones determine our view of their 
military performance. Most armies, like most societies, produce just suf-
ficient able or competent professionals to do their business. Journalism, 
since the nineteenth century, might say the same. 
Now, while I am still sketching some of the background of modern 
war reporting, I should like to focus briefly upon two historical points 
that seem to me important. The first concerns the British experience in 
World War I. In August 1914, British military commanders and politi-
cians felt that they had seen sufficient of newspapers and newspapermen 
over the past half century to be certain that the war then commencing 
would be carried on far more agreeably and efficiently without the 
presence of those whom they termed with wholehearted irony "the 
gentlemen of the press." Thus it was that for many months, information 
reaching the British public from Flanders was both negligible and often 
wildly inaccurate. No journalists were afforded opportunities to visit the 
front, or given significant access to even the most pedestrian and inciden-
tal military information. Yet as the war dragged on, as the losses 
mounted horrifically and victory seemed further and further away, with 
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the utmost reluctance the directors of the British war effort were com-
pelled by their political masters to review policy. They began to unders-
tand that the public's ignorance of what was happening in France, of 
what its millions of men in uniform were doing, was seriously sapping 
the nation's morale. Here was the country engaged upon the greatest 
military effort in its history. Yet its people knew nothing, literally 
nothing of the lives their sons and husbands were enduring in the tren-
ches. The decision was made that it was essential to accredit some cor-
respondents to G.H.Q., to allow newspapers to give the public some vi-
sion of the British war effort. Now, the quality of British reporting re-
mained poor to the end of World War I, and the degree of access granted 
by the generals was pathetically limited. But a central reality was 
acknowledged, which I believe has permanent significance. To sustain 
the will of a modern democracy for a war which lasts any length of time, 
it is essential to tell its people what is being done in their name. One of 
many pernicious consequences of the war in Vietnam is that it has caused 
some soliders, above all in the United States, to suppose that they can do 
their business better if the prying eyes of the media are kept at a distance. 
Yet I would argue that in a modern society, this is a misjudgment. I 
would make a further point, equally often disputed by professional 
soldiers. The men of armies affect, in public among each other, a scorn 
for publicity. Yet I never cease to be amazed by how deeply in reality 
they crave recognition. When they are risking their lives daily in the face 
of the enemy, it is of the utmost importance to them to feel that their 
own people know and understand and appreciate what they are doing. 
Soldiers and sailors in action are infuriated and disgusted by press exag-
gerations, or reports that unreasonably frighten or dismay their families 
at home. But they want their kin to know all that can be told about what 
is happening to them. I will offer two stories to illustrate this point, each 
derived from the Falklands war. In the early days after we landed at San 
Carlos, it quickly became apparent that the battle between the Argentine 
air force and the Royal Navy was critical. Yet there was no reporter 
aboard any of the front line frigates. I flew out to the command ship, 
and harassed the naval staff to be allowed to visit one of the frigates 
bearing the brunt of the battle. They were dismissive, arguing that there 
was no time for nonsense of this sort. I turned eventually to the captain, 
an uncommonly thoughtful man, who at once saw the point. Between 
Argentine sorties, he had me sent to the frigate Arrow. When I got there, 
I was besieged by rude remarks from the sailors, who demanded to know 
where all the reporters had been, because they were weary of turning on 
the BBC World Service, and hearing so much said of the activities of the 
landing force, amid nothing from the navy's frigates at the centre of the 
storm. Without doubt, this silence had been demoralizing to them. 
A second story in the same vein: the Ministry of Defence censors 
normally deleted all mention of which units were engaged in operations 
from reporters' copy. But after the Parachute Regiment's triumph at 
Goose Green, for morale reasons it was decided to let it be known that 2 
Para had been responsible for the British victory. Once that unit's 
presence was on record, 2 Para's further activities continued to be 
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reported and referred to. Then, on the night of June 11th, 1982, three 
Royal Marine Commandos carried out exceptionally gallant and successful 
attacks upon Argentine hill positions overlooking Port Stanley. I filed a 
long report on the experience of 42 Commando, with whom I climbed 
Mount Harriet. This was duly carried in full in most British newspapers. 
But the MoD censors deleted all reference to the unit's idenity, and even to 
the fact that its men wore green berets. To their bitter rage and fury, 
therefore, the Marines heard and later saw extensive reporting of 2 Para's 
activities elsewhere, while their own achievements gained no identifiable 
publicity. Now, some soldiers and especially some generals will declare 
that publicity does not matter. But I would submit, both from personal ex-
perience and from the study of recent military history, that it is of real im-
portance both for sustaining the will of the nation at home for the fight, 
and that of the soldiers on the battlefield. The fact that both causes are 
sometimes injured by adverse or hostile publicity does not, in my view, 
outweigh the basic validity of the case, the balance of advantage. 
Closely related to the point I have just raised, of course, is that of 
censorship. One reason I have always possessed a special interest in 
military affairs and in journalism is that my father, in World War II, was 
the war correspondent of a well-known British weekly of the period, 
named Picture Post. A collection of his dispatches was published in Bri-
tain in 1942 under the half ironic title "Passed As Censored." When I 
was around 20 years old, and just becoming conscious of some of the 
realities, as distinct from the boyish illusions of war, I read again my 
father's account of accompanying a Bomber Command raid upon the 
German battlecruisers Scharnhorst and Gneisenau at Brest. I challenged 
him: "Why have you written about something like this as if it was an ex-
citing adventure on which the pilots enjoyed embarking? This isn't what 
war is really like." My father answered me by saying simply: "We were 
at war. What I was doing was part of the war effort, if ou start to tell peo-
ple the truth about what happened when the blackout curtains come 
down, and it's all over." His remarks had a considerable influence upon 
me, and later created a signficant division between myself and some of 
my media collègues. Over some years during which I was reporting wars 
abroad for British newspapers and for the BBC—in Indochina, the Mid-
dle East, Angola, India and so on—I regarded it as my responsibility to 
tell as much as I could discover to readers about what was going on, to 
circumvent military censorship in these countries by any means. If, in 
Israel, this meant flying to Cyprus from Tel Aviv with film in my shoes, 
so be it. But when the Falklands came, and I was accompanying the 
British task force southwards, I made a conscious decision: I was British, 
and this was a British war. I believed that it was the duty of those at 
home to conduct the public debate about whether the war was a good 
thing. I thought that, as one of only 20-odd correspondents reporting the 
war from the scene, I should tell the tale as sympathetically and yes, as 
patriotically as I could. 
In reality, on the battlefield, I was confronted by only one test of 
conscience, if one can dignify it as such. In the days after the landing at 
San Carlos, I sent dispatches that presented our morale as much higher, 
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our confidence rather greater, than in truth it was, when we were wat-
ching our ships take such a battering at the hands of the Argentine air 
force, and when we were operting in this desolate wilderness so very far 
from home. I admitted that I had done this when we began the media 
postmortems after the war, and I have been roundly rebuked for it by 
some of my professional colleagues. Now, they knew that in any event, 
the censors with absolute control of our communications would never 
have allowed me to file a dispatch declaring that the Task Force was 
deeply disheartened, and that one more good push by the Argentine air 
force might prove decisive. But even had I been able to, should I have 
aspired to do so? Some of my British colleagues, and a great many of my 
American ones would say yes, I should have done. I never cease to be 
amazed by the fashion in which many American journalists—some very 
distinguished—declare a loyalty to our trade which is thought to 
outweigh that which they owe to their country, or any other institution. 
E.M. Forster, the novelist, may have declared that he hoped to possess 
the courage to place loyalty to his friends above loyalty to this country. 
But I cannot say that I believe the argument for placing the cause of the 
press or the supposed support of free speech above that of country 
should command the same transcending respect. In Britain, there have 
been many debates about censorship in future wars since the Falklands 
conflict ended. Some journalists, and even some editors, continue to 
declare that they reject the notion of any controls of any sort upon what 
they can or should report in a national conflict. I take the opposing view: 
that no sane government engaged in military operations can fail to im-
pose restrictions upon the reporting of these—where it is feasible to en-
force them. This last is a large reservation, given the progress of modern 
technology, and I shall return to it later. But while there is immense 
scope for debate about how censorship should operate, and how tightly it 
should be enforced, I believe that it would greatly enhance the credibility 
of the media in the eyes of government, and of military authorities, if 
journalists freely recognize the principle that national secrets, and above 
all, news of forthcoming military intentions, must be protected from 
enemy eyes, and thus from those of the public at large. At present, in 
both Britain and America, I believe that public respect for the media is 
severely damaged by its arrogance on this issue. Winston Churchill, as 
Britain's Prime Minister in 1944, told the House of Commons that he 
was causing censorship to be tightened, after the publication of some 
dispatches from the Italian front which declared that "desperate" 
fighting was taking place. Churchill said: "Such words as 'desperate' 
ought not to be used about a position in a battle when they are false. Still 
less should they have been used if they were true." 
Whether or not one chooses explicitly to accept Churchill's view on 
this issue, I believe that democracies can reconcile censorship with their 
traditional allegiance to free speech in one important manner: by draw-
ing a distinction between a policy of withholding the truth for a 
time—while it is tactically important—and withholding it forever. I lost 
some of the military friends I made in the Falklands campaign by writing 
very frankly, both for my paper and in a subsequent book,1 about some 
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of the mistakes that had been made in the campaign, once it was over. I am 
saddened by the loss of the friends, but I have no regrets. Once hostilities 
ceased, I saw nothing improper about reintroducing the traditional prin-
ciples of revelation that play such a large part in journalism. Indeed, I 
deplore the fashion in which some regiments and individuals have sought 
to distort the history of the campaign, since it ended—above all, the man-
ner in which it is discussed in military teaching establishments—solely for 
reasons of pride and prestige. Only by frankness after the event can impor-
tant military lessons be learned. In this process those of us who are outside 
the military hierarchy possess a freedom of speech and action which can be 
beneficial. 
Yet one of the greatest problems we face in reconciling the demands 
of the media with those of modern war, is the speed of the transition that 
may nowadays prove necessary between the ethos of peace, and that of 
conflict. Something was learned in World War I about news management 
in national conflict. But in 1939, all the lessons had painfully to be learned 
again. It was not until 1941 at least that the British press and the govern-
ment settled down to a reasonably satisfactory professional relationship, 
which endured until the end of the Second World War. Not only was there 
a vital learning process for the institutions concerned, for editors and 
ministers. It was also necessary for a generation of journalists in the field 
to learn about the realities of war, and of armies, navies and air forces. 
Over the months and years, they did so. Some of the greatest war reporting 
of all time was carried out by such men as Alan Moorehead and Ernie 
Pyle. 
Yet in the future, it is highly unlikly that a major western democracy 
which becomes engaged in a conflict will have time for the "learning 
curve" experienced in the world wars. Media organizations and their 
staffs, who have spent their entire professional lives devoted to the concept 
of publishing everything that comes their way, to preserving chronic skep-
ticism about the activities of governments and institutions, may suddenly 
be called upon to think in a wholly new way about the news that is coming 
in to them, which might represent the greatest and most important na-
tional story of their lives. It will not be easy. All their deepest instincts 
about the handling of government requests or directives will demand that 
they should kick against the pricks. In my view, it is essential in peacetime 
for government to maintain a constant dialogue with news organizations 
about the possible demands and requirements of conflict situations, to 
keep politicians and soldiers, journalists and bureaucrats thinking hard 
and carefully about what such armed contingencies could mean for them. 
And a further serious difficulty obtains today: the resolution of 
perceived media ethical dilemmas amid journalists' military ignorance. 
In the nineteenth century, military operations were conducted sufficient-
ly slowly to give civilian journalists a great deal of time to learn, if they 
chose, about armies and their affairs before a crisis came on the bat-
tlefield. Between 1914 and 1960, a very large number of British jour-
nalists—like their American and Canadian counterparts—learned much 
at firsthand about soldiering. Many correspondents, well into the 1960s, 
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possessed some national service experience, which could inform their 
reporting. Yet today, only a very small number of journalists in any 
Western nation possess personal experience of military affairs. And of 
all human activities, war is one which requires a high degree of 
knowledge, to make a sensible appreciation of what is taking place on the 
battlefield. In my own experience of journalism, I have found nothing 
more difficult than to make a strategic judgement based on the very 
fragmented, inadquate and usually inaccurate information garnered on 
bumpy jeep rides around the front, casual conversations with junior of-
ficers, glimpses of a tiny portion of the wider reality. 
To give an example: in October 1973,1 flew to Tel Aviv to report the 
Yom Kippur War imbued with the same confidence as most of my col-
leagues in the absolute supremacy of the Israeli army. Having attended a 
characteristically arrogant press conference given by the Chief of Staff in 
Tel Aviv, I made my way the next morning to the Golan Heights by taxi, 
via unauthorized roads through the kibbutzes. This was a time honoured 
fashion for foreign journalists to get close enough to report Israel's wars, 
since we were normally accorded no official facilities worth mentioning 
to go to the front under escort. 
Within a very few minutes of getting onto the Golan, it was self-
evident that the picture painted for us in Tel Aviv had been wildly op-
timistic. The scale of damage and military wreckage, matched by fierce 
gunfire both incoming and outgoing, made plain that a desperate battle 
was in progress. I made my way over to a group of Centurion tanks that 
were rearming in haste, and talked a little to their crews, who were at the 
limit of exhaustion. Later that morning, I returned to Tel Aviv to file as 
strong a story as the censor would allow about the seriousness of the bat-
tle upon which Israel was plainly engaged. But I did not know then, and I 
could not know until I read the books years later, that the group of 
tankmen I talked to that third morning on the hills represented, at that 
time, about a third of Israel's remaining tank strength on the Golan. 
Context—a sense of perspective—this is what is hardest for a journalist 
to come by on the battlefield. Yet the problem becomes near insuperable 
if, like some journalists who accompanied the British task force to the 
Falklands, one is driven to asking soldiers en route to the front the dif-
ference between a company and a platoon, a battalion and brigade, the 
range of a 105mm gun. Even given determination and honourable inten-
tions on the part of the journalist, it is very difficult effectievely and ac-
curately to report military affairs without some background of 
knowledge. 
Yet defence in peactime is not a fashionable subject in which many 
of the best young journalists want to specialize. Since the Falklands, the 
British services have consciously sought to cultivate closer relations with 
journalists, in the hope that thus a cadre of informed correspondents will 
become available to report in conflict situations. The army has the easiest 
task, because it is in most frequent contact with journalists, not least in 
Northern Ireland. In recent years, it has also displayed the greatest skill 
and astuteness in its public relations. Yet the Royal Navy has the same 
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problem as the United States and in some measure the Canadian armies: 
the remoteness of most of their bases and training areas from centres of 
population and journalistic activity. The American army has tried hard 
to address the problem of improving mutual understanding between 
journalists and soldiers by creating the Defence Information School at 
Fort Benjamin Harrison, where some 1500 persons a year learn the basics 
of journalism and news management. But the problem remains, and 
there will always be a deep gulf of trust and understanding between 
soldiers and reporters. When I, like other British journalists, have been 
asked to give evidence to the various committees studying relations bet-
ween the services and the media in future wars, I have urged a measure of 
caution about hoping for too much from cultivating peacetime connec-
tions. In peacetime, frankly, those reporters who are most readily 
available to spend two or three weeks on exercise with a naval task group 
are not those most valued by their news organizations. I believe the arm-
ed forces will do better to aim to take to war the ablest and brightest of 
the available generation of journalists, regardless of their military ex-
perience. They will seek to compensate for military ignorance by pro-
viding journalists in a theatre of war with the best possible escort of-
ficers, pre-selected for this role by a high command which recognizes the 
critical importance of achieving a high standard of news coverage. 
Civilian press escorts employed by the Defense Department or the 
Ministry of Defence are perfectly adequate for arranging routine 
peacetime visits. But they will not do in war—indeed, they failed 
miserably in the Falklands. Unit press officers of a high standard, 
however, have been an immense success for the British both in the 
Falklands and in Northern Ireland. Commissioned press escorts com-
mand the appropriate respect both from journalists and from the 
military command. The Israeli Defence Force also employs this system, 
to good effect. I believe that both the armed forces and the general public 
will profit more in a conflict from seeing the work of high-quality 
reporters assisted by high-quality military escort and guidance, than giv-
ing pole position for facilities at the front to more pedestrian reporters 
whose only merit is that they have covered the defence beat for years. 
That is not to deny that there are some superb professional defence cor-
respondent in all our countries. Partly because The Daily Telegraph has a 
large military readership, when I became its editor almost three years 
ago, I took on our finest military historian and strategic analyst, John 
Keegan, as Defence Editor, and an exceptionally able ex-Falklands BBC 
correspondent, Robert Fox, as Defence Correspondent. But few other 
British newspapers are anything like so well served in this field. The 
tabloid papers, of course, bring to defence the same instinct for mindless 
sensationalism that informs their coverage in other fields. But it is naive 
not to acknowledge that they too expect to be able to feed the appetites 
of their vast readership in conflicts. The cynicism about the press of 
naval officers with the British South Atlantic force in 1982 was in no way 
diminished by discovering that The Sun and Daily Star correspondents 
aboard were almost solely preoccupied with the activities of Lieutenant 
Prince Andrew; and that the most famous headline of the war, and one 
of the most dreadful of all time, ran across the front page of The Sun the 
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day the heavy cruiser Belgrano was sunk: "GOTCHA." Yet it is not 
enough for others of us, as professional colleagues, or for the military 
command, merely to ignore the existence of the tabloid press. For better 
or for worse, it reaches a vast readership. Somehow, its strange needs 
must be acknowledged and met, even at a moment of national crisis, 
when matters of life and death are being decided. 
Returning once again to wider issues: most armies still have an enor-
mous amount to learn about the importance of creating, and maintain-
ing, their credibility with journalists. In Vietnam, the phrase "credibility 
gap" entered the language. An old friend and outstanding war cor-
respondent who was killed in the 1973 Middle East War, Nicholas 
Tomalin, gave me some parting advice before I left for my first trip to 
Vietnam early in 1970. "Remember," he said: "They lie, they lie, they 
lie." Some American soldiers would say that this was a classic example 
of journalistic arrogance and lack of understanding. But I am afraid that 
Tomalin's warning was confirmed by all my own subsequent experiences 
in Indochina. A belief that one's own side's word can be trusted is a 
priceless asset. Yet day after day in Vietnam, American officers 
squandered it. I, like most journalists, regard it as our duty to clamour 
constantly for information, and to rage when it is denied to us. Yet in a 
sense, our rage is ritualistic. We are doing our duty, yet we recognize—or 
we should—the duty of those who deny it to us. Silence can always be 
honourable, even if it is sometimes imprudent. But systematic deceit is 
self-destructive, and its re-employment during the Grenada operation 
suggests that the U.S. armed forces have not yet lost faith in its efficacy. 
That is not to say that I support the extraordinarily arrogant behaviour 
of the U.S. media when they were denied the opportunity to participate 
in the Grenada landings. But it seemed gratuitous for the U.S. Command 
to go beyond denying access, and to tell the media untruths about small 
things as well as large. These have been chronicled in some detail in the 
study of the media and the Grenada operation conducted by the Cardiff 
Centre of Journalism Studies for the Ministry of Defence.2 I do not 
believe that U.S. officers behaved as they did as part of a concerted pro-
paganda effort by the U.S. forces. I am a great believer in the cock-up, 
rather than the conspiracy theory of history. I think U.S. behaviour was 
born of an indifference on the part of commanders deeply embittered by 
the Indochina experience as to whether they told the media the truth or 
not. Self-interest by a nation's armed forces should cause them to 
hesitate before providing misinformation, or for that matter disinforma-
tion. On May 19th, 1982, the senior British civil servant at the Ministry 
of Defence, Sir Frank Cooper, told assembled editors at an unat-
tributable briefing in London that there would be no large-scale landing 
in the Falklands, more likely a small-scale series of harassing operations. 
Less than 48 hours later, after British papers had headlined this story in 
every edition, a full-scale British brigade landing took place at San 
Carlos. Now, I happen to think that this one-off piece of disinformation, 
in pursuit of an important strategic objective, was fully justified. But I 
think it was wise that a civil servant accepted the odium for disseminating 
a deliberate lie, rather than allowing a member of the armed forces to do 
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so. I also believe that this is a game which must be played with the utmost 
restraint. Do it once in a campaign, and its purpose will probably be 
understood by the public and by the media, and official credibility can 
recover. But if it becomes a systematic weapon, then a chronic "credibili-
ty gap" is created, which it may take years to bridge. The Cardiff study 
of the Grenada operation and U.S. media response to it noted that many 
of those who are today editors and decision-makers in the U.S. media 
served as reporters in the Vietnam era. They concluded in the 1960s that 
the word of the military could not be trusted. They will not trust it now. 
But whether for the Americans, the Israelis, the British, or the 
Canadians, the same problem obtains in handling the modern media at 
war: there are far more journalists who want to report than there can be 
facilities available to handle them. It seems essential to accept the in-
evitability of this situation from the outset, and plan accordingly. Viet-
nam was unique, in providing a large and semi-static war zone whose 
parameters shifted little for fifteen years. Thus, for a time, a large 
number of journalists could roam more or less at will, with the aid and 
vast transport resources of the U.S. armed forces. It should be said as an 
aside, however, that some odd myths prevail today about Vietnam as a 
place where a reporter could whistle up a helicopter at will. One of my 
own lasting memories of the theatre is of waiting for days, sometimes, 
for a helicopter or fixed wing ride to my chosen destination. Vietnam 
could be a tough place to get around. Yet American generosity and will-
ingness to provide transport was never in doubt. This is not a situation 
very likely to obtain in a future conflict. Most major world military crises 
today attract up to 2000 journalists and broadcasters. Some of these peo-
ple, it must be said, have no desire to leave the capital, and are perfectly 
happy to do their reporting from press centres and hotels. So be it. But 
others—including all the good ones—will want to go to the front. 
There is only one possible approach from the point of view of the 
military command: ruthlessly to recognize the limitations of what can be 
done, and to organize a pool for selected reporters and TV crews, who 
are afforded transport, escorts and information as appropriate, together 
with the highest degree of access. It is not difficult for the government or 
military command of a nation to determine which news organizations 
must be represented or allowed to ballot for places in a pool. The British 
government—frankly, rather foolishly—decreed the numbers but impos-
ed no other restrictions on the composition of the Falklands Task Force 
press pool, which it preferred to leave to Fleet Street. As a result, some 
reporters embarked who proved quite unable to work once in the South 
Atlantic, as a result of professional inadequacy or physical unfitness. 
If I am ever offering advice to armed forces members new to handl-
ing journalists, it is first, to restrain the impulse to succumb to revulsion 
about our group behaviour. There are few uglier spectacles in the 
modern world than that of a mob of competitive media people turned 
loose upon a hot story. The fisticuffs, the cynicism, the inhumanity 
towards suffering, the stupidity and selfishness and ignorance displayed 
by college-educated journalists who, at home, treat at least their second 
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wives quite decently, make all of us, at times, ashamed to be journalists. 
I know. I have been among those baying throngs, willing to go to almost 
any lengths in pursuit of a story. Even soldiers for whom war is a profes-
sion tend to recoil in disgust from the animal behaviour of journalists in 
bulk. 
It is impossible to dispute that, since the nineteenth century, news 
organizations have ruthlessly exploited the fact that war can be good for 
business, can add millions of viewers and readers. I have to say that my 
own reputation as a reporter in Britain chiefly rests upon a certain 
notoriety gained in covering conflicts. In the course of these, to get 
somewhere or to file a story, I have done my share of things that have 
provoked disgust among military witnesses. I have schemed and lied to 
gain places on helicopters, shouted down junior officers and sought to 
intimidate signals or transport personnel. My defence would be that, fac-
ed with petty military bureaucracy, I should never otherwise have been 
able to file my stories. Armed forces rest for their very survival upon 
obedience, group loyalty and coherence. Successful journalism relies 
upon the remorseless pursuit of self-interest. For those in military or 
government authority who have to live with journalists, it seems to me 
essential to focus not upon the means being employed by the reporters, 
but upon the ends to be served. It is a mistake for officers to spurn jour-
nalists because they are dismayed by what they see of their personal 
behaviour. Instead, they need to remember that some of those same jour-
nalists possess remarkable gifts for conveying to the public at home what 
is being done in the field and why; that sometimes, some of those same 
scruffy reporters have formed shrewder assessments of what is going on 
than the military high command—their independence of thought and ac-
tion can, therefore, on occasion be of the utmost value; and that their 
function can be of immense importance to the armed forces and the 
country. From among the struggling rabble at the press conference, pick 
out the handful who are good—really good—and concentrate upon 
working with them. The good journalists, the good war reporters, do 
have something to be proud of, not least a measure of courage. For those 
who have to work with them, merely remember that you don't have to 
like the singer. You must merely judge the quality of his song. Few suc-
cessful military commanders have been agreeable men socially. Military 
gentlemen, admired for their manners, often fail on the battlefield 
because they lack the killer instinct. The same might be said of jour-
nalists. 
It is often remarked that, on a future European battlefield, it will be 
impossible physically to prevent large numbers of reporters roaming 
freely, with access to their own satellite communications. This may be 
true. Yet military authorities will always be in a position to offer news 
organizations a trade of transport, protection, and privileged access and 
information, in return for a measure of censorship of film or copy. I 
believe that this is an exchange which it is strongly in the interests of both 
governments and news organizations to accept. As a former foreign cor-
respondent, I have often had to make my own rather frightened way 
across foreign battlefields, to which as a reporter from a non-combatant 
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nation, I cannot expect official access. I do not resent this, because from 
the point of view of the combatant nation, it makes sense. No sensible 
government is likely to give much privileged access to journalists over 
whom it has no control. Israel sometimes grants special facilities to 
American correspondents, because of her special dependence upon U.S. 
goodwill. Since the Falklands, it has sometimes been suggested that the 
British government's pronoucements, and British reporters' dispatches, 
would have possessed greater credibility if one or more foreign jour-
nalists had been with the Task Force, adding their own voices. I have 
some doubts how well this would have worked, in the specially difficult 
physical environment of the South Atlantic, where those of us who 
reported on the ground often had to walk for hours or days with the 
marines. In one case, I remember that in return for being permitted to 
take up a helicopter place on our night landing on Mount Kent, I 
volunteered to carry a Blowpipe missile. Some of my colleagues would 
have found this morally repugnant. Yet I considered it a fair trade, when 
a valuable load-carrying marine was being left behind in order to take 
me. As an Englishman, I felt no great moral burden about thus making a 
small contribution to the war effort. But had I been an American or a 
Frenchman, I might well have done so. 
In the propaganda struggle that is now an essential part of every 
conflict, many governments are above all preoccupied by the television 
pictures seen by the world. It must be said that the difficulties of convey-
ing accurately, effectively, or even remotely truthfully what happens on 
the battlefied remain enormous, and are likely to continue to do so, 
because of the intrinsic nature of the television medium. This is, I am 
afraid—and I speak as a practitioner with some direct experience—the 
most distorting of information channels. Television companies give most 
airtime to the stories of which they have best footage. Yet again and 
again and again, the result grossly misrepresents what has taken place. A 
viewer who looks at the assembled television footage of the Falklands 
war would have a quite false impression of what the campaign was like, 
because all the film was shot in daylight. Yet most of the military activi-
ty, and almost all the land fighting, took place at night. I have now in my 
mind's eye the most vivid picture of the Battle for Mount Harriet. Yet 
this action taking place in the last generation of the twentieth century is 
recorded only in the watercolour impressions of a war artist painting 
after the event. This state of affairs will obviously recur, given the impor-
tance of night fighting in modern war. 
One of the first films I made for BBC TV was shot in Cambodia 
with the U.S. army in the spring of 1970, during the American drive to 
clear the North Vietnamese sanctuaries. In one of these, I was interview-
ing a U.S. colonel beside a captured rice cache when suddenly a few in-
coming shots were fired over our heads. All of us took cover with speed, 
and after a few seconds of confusion, the Americans returned fire. Peace 
soon broke out again, and we all clambered to our feet. "How much of 
that did you get on film?", demanded our producer. "Not much," said 
the cameraman, "because we were all under that truck." The producer 
brooded for a moment, then turned to the U.S. colonel: "Tell me," he 
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asked, "do you think you could do that again? You know, get somebody 
to fire a few shots, everybody take cover and return the fire, and so 
on . . . ." Now, that colonel and even my innocent self were fairly ap-
palled by this exchange. Yet to that producer, a fine television profes-
sional, the proposal merely reflected the normality of what is done daily 
in peacetime documentary film making—the attempt to recreate for the 
camera the resemblance of what has taken place. Again and again all 
over the world, I have seen artillery or automatic weapons asked to open 
fire at the behest of television crews. Indeed, after the 1972 Indo-
Pakistan war, it emerged that the CBS crew with the Indians had nearly 
destroyed their colleagues filming with the Pakistanis at the same time, 
while playing this game. The pressure upon TV crews to produce for New 
York—or, happily in lesser measure, London or Toronto—the nightly 
dose of "bang bang," the only footage editors really want from a war 
zone such as Beirut, has often cost mens' lives, and represents the lowest 
denominator of media activity in modern conflict. The U.S. networks' 
cynicism in this was highlighted in the latter days in Vietnam, when it 
became common practise to employ so-called TCNs—Third Country Na-
tionals such as Koreans—to film the most dangerous battles, because 
their deaths were so much less expensive for their employers. Television, 
that marvellous medium of impression, and fatally flawed medium of 
analysis, has exercised a baleful influence upon modern war correspon-
ding. It has brought unforgettable, terrible images into hundreds of 
millions of homes. It has exercised an overwhelming influence upon 
political attitudes to some conflicts, above all Vietnam. I do not believe 
that it has contributed much, if anything, to real understanding of the 
conflicts upon which its lenses have fallen. Television can convey only 
what stands before the camera's eye: nothing else, not the atrocities of 
the enemy, the successes or failures outside the cameraman's focus, the 
night battles or the feel of the theatre of war. I remember the dismay I 
felt, on first viewing films I had made in Cambodia in the air-
conditioned comfort of a viewing theatre in London months later. I saw 
nothing there of the heat, the dirt, the incessant physical discomfort 
under which we had laboured. Colour, even in the hands of a skilled 
practitioner, I believe to be an inappropriate means of conveying war. 
Only black and white film can do justice to its reality. 
Yet television—colour television—will stay with us, and we must 
live with its shortcomings. The only course open to military commands 
and government is to ensure that they have a thorough understanding of 
its practices and failings as they watch its troubled meandering across the 
battlefield. We can no more disinvent or even banish it than we can the 
atomic bomb. In Britain at least, I am sometimes encouraged by a grow-
ing public understanding of television's weaknesses, and a reduced 
susceptibility to its least rational, most emotional appeals. I would like to 
add, also, that I reject the view sometimes advanced by American 
military men, that the media in general and television in particular lost 
them the war in Vietnam. This is a myth which is strongly against the real 
interests of the U.S. military to nurture. The media were sometimes bit-
terly unfair to the U.S. armed forces in Vietnam, for instance in 
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projecting the 1968 Tet Offensive as an American defeat. I warmly sup-
ported America's objectives in Vietnam, and have lamented their defeat 
ever since I was helicoptered out of the U.S. Embassy compound in 
Saigon one evening at the end of April 1975. But I am convinced that 
America lost that war for cultural and military reasons that would have 
been decisive without any intervention by the media. 
Ten years ago now, an Australian journalist named Philip Knightley 
wrote a history of war corresponding entitled The First Casualty.3 It was 
his thesis that war correspondents, and especially British ones, have per-
sistently failed their societies through the ages, by failing to tell the truth 
from the battlefield, for reasons of either incompetence or political cor-
ruption. Knightley cited among his own credentials the fact that he had 
never reported a war himself. His work sold very well, and achieved 
something of a cult following at that period when anti-institutionalism in 
the West generally, and Britain in particular, was at its height. I 
disagreed profoundly with the book, and find it reads as absurdly today 
as it did when I first reviewed it. First, in his contempt for the contempti-
ble practitioners of war corresponding, of whom we have all seen plenty 
in bars from Beirut to Phnom Penh, Knightley ignores the long roll call 
of great reporters. In writing my own books on World War II, I have 
often looked back with immense admiration on the writings of Drew 
Middleton, Alan Moorehead, Alexander Clifford and others, men of the 
greatest gifts, who have exercised them to the highest purpose on the bat-
tlefield. 
But beyond mere personal debunking, I believe Knightley misses the 
essential point about war reporting. All proper journalism is about trying 
to build jigsaws with many of the pieces missing. This is why we are do-
ing so well, even in peacetime, to get the story half right, when most of 
our sources of information, including official ones, lie or distort routine-
ly. This is part of their trade, just as it is ours not to be bamboozled. But 
in war, far more of the jigsaw pieces are absent. It is seldom remotely 
possible, during a conflict, to learn the other side of the story from the 
enemy. It is difficult enough even to paste together enough fragments 
from the side one is accompanying to create a plausible image. To get it 
right 40% in wartime is a remarkable achievement for a journalist. One 
is groping, fumbling in darkness. The choice is not whether to tell the 
public, the reader, lies or the truth, but whether to tell him what portion 
of the truth one can garner—or nothing at all. One is struggling for in-
sights. I shall always remember the sudden flash of understanding that 
came to me and a colleague in Sinai in October 1973. For days the Israelis 
had been telling us that their cross-Suez operations were mere commando 
raids. Suddenly, we perceived that in reality, these represented the 
Israelis' major thrust against the Egyptian front. We were then obliged 
to go to tortured lengths to find our way through the dark to the Canal, 
at an hour when in the movement of forces there was least chance of two 
journalists on illegal business being intercepted, to confirm our guess. 
We were proud, when we filed a version that we somehow got though the 
censors—the first foreign reporters' dispatches from the Egyptian bank 
of the Canal—that we had managed to find out as much as we did. Yet if 
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I looked up that dispatch today, I know that I should find that we were 
wrong on a host of points, that what I wrote contributed nothing of the 
slightest value to a military historian. Our readers had to be content that 
we had conveyed one simple fact—that the Israelis were across the Canal 
in strength, and that this was plainly their major counter-offensive. And 
if you detect in the above a sharp contrast between the attitude to revela-
tion that I have described in myself and others when we reported the 
Falklands, our own nation's war, and that which we adopted in the Mid-
dle East, then of course you are right. That is why I believe that sensible 
governments work with their own nation's journalists in their wars, and 
not with other peoples'. 
Armed forces, the most disciplined element in their own societies, 
will seldom or never sit comfortably with journalists, the least disciplined 
and most anarchic breed of men and women. Nor will it ever be easy to 
reconcile the fact that in peacetime, it is the duty of editors and reporters 
to maintain a constant degree of tension between ourselves and our 
governments, while with the outbreak of conflict, a sense of common 
purpose must be forged. There can never be a universally applicable for-
mula for relations between governments and the media at war, because 
despite all that I have said about the proper demands of patriotism, a 
good journalist will also be faced with a constant dilemma, about how 
far he is justified or truly patriotic if he conceals military incompetence 
from his readers, from the public. Throughout my own war correspon-
ding career, I was blessed with one advantage which few of my col-
leagues—and especially few of my American colleagues—possessed: my 
own liking for soldiers. I respect them, get on pretty well with them, and 
count a good many of them among my friends. That is a great help if, on 
the battlefield, one is totally dependent upon their goodwill to do one's 
job, and sometimes even for one's own survival. In one sense, I was very 
fortunate in the Falklands. I always possessed confidence in the British 
command, and was never troubled by doubts about whether the cam-
paign was being efficiently conducted. Had major difficulties or failures 
have arisen, I might have found myself faced by much more testing pro-
fessional and moral dilemmas than I encountered. As it was, these never 
arose. Indeed, I found that war a very moving experience, for a 36 year-
old Englishman who had grown up in a long period of decline, and post-
Suez trauma. Perforce, I had spent a substantial part of my career repor-
ting on and reflecting about British shortcomings and British failures. 
Now, suddenly, I found myself part of something that I thought the 
British were doing very well. Some of my colleagues have since reproach-
ed me for losing my objectivity, for sacrificing my sense of detachment. 
Yet in truth, I felt then what I still feel now—a sense of intense pride and 
pleasure in having had the opportunity to play a small part in, and to 
record, one my nation's greatest modern successes. The reporting of 
military operations by journalists need not always be a tale of bitterness, 
alienation and castigation of the armed forces. It can also be a story of 
respect, affection and admiration, as it has often been for me. 
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